The Independent Schools Council is a politically independent, not-for-profit organisation representing 1,270 independent schools educating more than 500,000 children. It exists to promote choice, diversity and excellence in education, developing talent at all levels of ability and from all backgrounds.

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DfES Information sharing databases in Children's Services: consultation on recording practitioner details for potentially sensitive services and recording concern about a child or young person

19 January 2005

Response from the Independent Schools Council

The Independent Schools Council (ISC) represents the seven leading Associations of Independent Schools in the United Kingdom. There are 1,278 ISC schools, educating 508,000 children. Because many children move between the maintained and independent sectors, around one child in ten will be educated in an ISC school at some stage in his or her schooling.

ISC schools contain children of all levels of ability and from all socio-economic classes. There are few if any factors which are unique either to independently educated children or to children educated in the maintained sector. This response is intended to be on behalf of all children, whether in the education system or not.

CONTENTS

2 Overview

3 Executive Summary

8 Detailed Response

14 Comments on Numbered Paragraphs

15 Freedom of Information Act requests

18 Freedom of Information Act requests

OVERVIEW

Children, young people and families have a right under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to respect for privacy and family life
Under the Data Protection Act, consent to release sensitive personal information, which includes information relating to health, is not valid unless it is informed and specific on each occasion (a "blanket" consent is not valid)
The ECHR rights, and the Data Protection Act barring of the release of sensitive personal information without consent, may, under existing law, be overridden in exceptional circumstances, but the barriers are high: overriding ECHR must be "necessary"; overriding the principle of informed consent requires one of several strict criteria to be met
The starting points, therefore, are protection of privacy; protection of private information; respect for family life; and the principle of informed and specific consent before sensitive personal information is released
In contrast, the Children Act database proposals start from the opposite premiss, which is that information-sharing is an unequivocal good
When this premiss collides, as it is bound to, with ECHR and Data Protection Act principles, the logical, logistical and legal consequences are severe. The reality is that there is a principled, legal, logical, logistically sound and, in general, beneficial case for a database where information is appropriately shared concerning children at risk. Conversely, sharing information concerning the great majority of children who are not at risk is almost certain to be neither legal, logistically sound, nor (in general) beneficial
The dangers of inappropriate information sharing, or indeed malicious access and malicious dissemination, are very real. This danger needs, in all cases, to be reduced to the lowest extent practicable. In the case of children already at risk, the danger is balanced by the benefit to these children of appropriate information sharing. In the case of the majority of children not at risk, and for whom the databases will, on the Government's own figures, be of no benefit whatever during the entirety of their childhood, there is no balancing advantage and only a disbenefit
It is not an effective use of resources to set up databases of children where, according to the Government's own figures, the great majority of entries will never be used for their ostensible purpose
ECHR will need to be taken into account for every entry in the database for every child. That requires a balanced judgment at every stage as to the necessity of entering the information, and the judgment will need to be specific to the individual child. In common with Human Rights and Data Protection lawyers, we foresee a real likelihood of a large number of cases brought against local authorities, the government and "practitioners" - i.e. people who make entries on the database. The cost of these cases, including the cost in judicial time, the cost in time of medical practitioners, and the cost of additional insurance premiums ultimately met by the Government, needs to be taken into account in assessing the cost of these proposals.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Children Act is one of the most highly criticised pieces of recent legislation. Criticism has come from, among others:

The House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights
The Information Commissioner
Liberty
Major children's charities.

Criticism centres on (a) the overriding of the Right to Privacy and Family Life, guaranteed by the Human Rights Act; (b) the potential removal of Data Protection Act protections against the release of sensitive personal information without "explicit" and informed consent; (c) the potential overriding of the duty of confidentiality owed by doctors to patients; (d) fact that the database is intended to cover all children, and not merely children for whom data-sharing is necessary; and (e) the vagueness of the key phrase "indicator of concern" - the phrase which triggers high levels of potential exchange of information about a child.

There is also strong criticism of the fact that the primary legislation is non-specific, leaving the details, including infringements of Human Rights, to be decided by secondary legislation. The secondary legislation requires affirmative resolution: this is little or no protection, because the affirmative resolution process does not allow amendment. As a matter of principle, infringements of the Human Rights Act should require full debate in Parliament, including the possibility of amendment.

Although it is obviously right and sensible for data to be shared when necessary, it is equally obvious that data-sharing is not an unequivocal good: it carries risks to children and to families, including risks of being traced by violent partners, and including psychological or physical harm to children. Data-sharing therefore needs to be carefully controlled, proportionate to the need, and in accordance with Human Rights and Data Protection principles. The approach of the Children Act legislation has been Panglossian, in that the benefits of data-sharing have been given their full weight, and perhaps more so, whereas the risks and logistical problems, even where noted, have not returned the proposals to a proportionate or common-sense framework.

The proposal is for linked databases of gigantic proportions, and no doubt gigantic cost; most of whose records will never be used for their ostensible purpose, because data-sharing will never be needed for most children. Tens of thousands of people will have access to the databases, making data security somewhere between extremely difficult and impossible. There are no current estimates of the cost of rectification and redress if data is wrong. If access is restricted to carefully vetted professionals, much of their time may be wasted in recording routine information of little or no value. If access is not restricted, access may be available to people who have not been carefully vetted, and who will thereby have access to personal information about children, which is an obvious risk factor. Families who move home frequently, or are illegally in the UK, or are evading tax by working in the unregulated economy, are the families most likely to need help, and the least likely to appear on the databases. The databases are therefore precisely targeted at the people least likely to need them.

Human Rights Act principles. The Human Rights Act guarantees the right to privacy and family life. This right can be overridden if it is "necessary" in a functioning democracy. The proposed databases will include details of all children, whether this inclusion is necessary or not. On the Government's own figures, at least two thirds of children will never benefit from the data-sharing for which the databases are to be established. It therefore cannot be "necessary" for private data concerning these children to be recorded. The argument that it is unclear which children might at some stage have "additional needs" and therefore all children need to be on the databases does not carry any weight at all. "Necessary" means "necessary": it does not mean "conceivably of some value at some point in the future, though on balance probably not". Nor does "necessary" mean something as imprecise as enabling practitioners to "build up the bigger picture of a child's or young person's needs" [paragraph 3.3 of the consultation document]. The legislation has been certified as complying with the Human Rights Act, but it is unclear how that certificate can have been given. The Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), comprising members from the House of Lords and the House of Commons, has twice scrutinised the Children Bill (now Act) to consider the human rights implications of the information sharing provisions. They have declared concerns about ‘the sweeping nature of the powers conferred on the Secretary of State in relation to the holding and sharing of data on individual children, and the absence of clear safeguards for privacy rights on the face of the Bill'
Rational use of data. Many education bodies have signed up to a protocol supporting the rational use of data. ISC is likely to sign the protocol in the near future. The protocol argues for data to be collected once and used many times. The database proposals turn this protocol on its head: most data will not be used at all. It is therefore the reverse of a rational use of data
Improved information-sharing. "Improved information sharing will make more effective use of resources" [consultation document paragraph 2.3]. This is a Panglossian statement: yes in the cases where information sharing is in fact improved (trite but true); no if a database is set up and maintained where the majority of entries are of no use at all. It is acknowledged that the databases will not be used for their ostensible purpose for the majority of children. Setting up, and keeping up to date, records of no value is axiomatically a less effective use of resources. Of course Green Paper responses were "generally supportive of the need for improved information sharing": that is motherhood and apple pie. The downside of tens of millions of pieces of unused information, entered, verified, referred to, and updated, needs to be taken as a balancing factor
Targeting resources to where they are needed. In a series of discussions with officials ISC has raised the problem of keeping track of families who do not have a stable home, who may be illegally in the UK, who may not want to register with a GP, who may not want to pay tax; and of children who are trafficked into the UK for the purposes of prostitution. All of these are high risk examples where data sharing (indeed some element of data capture) may be of particular benefit. The response has been that there will be an "underclass" - this is a term used more than once by officials - who will be difficult to find. Children suspected of being trafficked, if their papers are in order, will be let into the country and will disappear from view. As a matter of logic, it is hard to see the point of databases which fail to capture - and therefore fail to help - the children and families most in need
Transient families and up-to-date information. No attempt seems to have been made to assess the number of data transactions per year. ISC has asked for an estimate in three separate meetings from March to December 2004, and there is still no answer. Officials have, however, said that in some London Boroughs a third of families move each year. Tracking these families - and there will tend to be a relationship between frequent moves and additional needs - will be difficult. Nor is it clear that officials have understood the fluid nature of what may constitute a family. The recent appalling case of a 31-year-old Hull woman, Tina Stevenson, pregnant with twins, who was stabbed and died, is a case in point. She lived on her own, but was the mother of five children - and expecting two more. Her five existing children lived elsewhere in at least two different locations. Keeping track of families such as this will be difficult. The danger is that database managers will concentrate on the 90% of families who are easy to trace, and ignore the 10% who are difficult - but who need most help. If performance targets are wrongly set or wrongly applied, this could be exactly what happens - making a nonsense of most of the purpose of the databases
Cause for concern. A fundamental of the proposed system is the ability for a practitioner to record an "indicator of concern" about a child, placed against the child's name. The fact, but not the nature, of the concern will be stated. Plainly, an indicator of concern placed by a specialist in sexually transmitted diseases, or pregnancy advice, or sexual abuse, or indeed dyslexia, alcohol abuse or any number of conditions or circumstances will tend to reveal precisely the nature of the concern. Even the fact of the child being seen by such a person, which will in general be recorded, will reveal the nature of the concern. Unless there are stringent safeguards, and it is not clear that there will be, the risks to children are very substantial:

their right to privacy in their access to services will be eroded or removed
knowledge that their teachers or parents, for example, may discover that they have accessed contraceptive services or mental health advice could inhibit them from seeking this advice. There are strong risks that the existence of the databases, far from providing children with the services they need, will discourage them from seeking those services. This is because the common law right to confidentiality is being overridden
knowledge that indicators of concern can be flagged in a widely accessed database may inhibit parents from seeking medical help for their children. A sports-playing child with severe bruising, for example, may not be taken to the doctor in case physical abuse is suspected and flagged. There is significant public scepticism about the common sense and rationality of public services where abuse is suspected, following the well publicised and well-documented Cleveland and Orkney scandals, and the Munchausen's syndrome by proxy controversy
one concern may breed another: one erroneously-posted concern may result in others for the same child, with a series of unfounded concerns added together

Why call it an indicator of concern? The criteria for raising an indicator of concern are stated in 3.23 of the consultation paper. None of them necessarily indicates concern: i.e. there may very well be no cause for concern about the individual child. What they do indicate is something which may be totally different, namely that the practitioner has some information which he or she wishes to share. The wish to share information is far from congruent with a cause for concern: there could be no concern but a wish to communicate; or there could be a concern and a wish to keep it private. Either the term of "indicator of concern" is misleading, or the definition in clause 3.23 is misleading, or both. We believe that this term is dangerously imprecise, dangerously misleading, liable to be interpreted in widely different ways by different specialties and practitioners, and should be abandoned.
Will databases be able to talk to each other? The proposal is for a separate database in every local authority - i.e. c 150 different databases. Children and their lives do not fit neatly within a single local authority area. They may live in one area, go to school in another, have a GP in a third, a different specialist in a fourth, and so on. That raises problems of sharing data between databases, and of whether there will be a "lead" database for each child. The idea of local databases is less Orwellian than a single national database, but the practical implication of sharing information across local authority boundaries in millions of cases is that there will, in effect, be a single national database. Unless this conclusion is wrong, the fact and its implications should be recognised. Implications include empowering database managers with abilities to search (in effect) nationally for details of children. Will these managers be CRB checked? Will temporary staff be CRB checked? What will be the penalties if information of commercial value is sold to the Press? We note that the key paragraph 3.3 in the consultation document refers to "the effectiveness of the database" (singular).
The Victoria Climbié case. It is widely assumed that the database proposals are intended to prevent another tragic case similar to the appalling case of Victoria Climbié and would have that effect. We repeat and adopt the conclusion from Liberty that the proposals would not provide additional protection in a similar case in the future. Express statutory information-sharing provisions are already in place for children at risk [Children's Act 1989 Sections 17 and 47, and Schedule2]. The reality in that case is that communication was allowed, but was ineffective. It was human error, rather than lack of access to other professionals and their knowledge, which had tragic consequences.

Conclusion

Tweaking the concept to cope with the difficulties is not going to work in the context of a universal database, because the practical and legal difficulties and dangers increase with volume, and with the intention, which is wrong in principle, to set up a database most of whose subjects will never find it of any benefit at all, but may find it personally damaging. There is a very real chance that the proposals will do more harm than good, at huge cost both directly and in soaking up scarce resources from highly-trained professionals.

DETAILED RESPONSE

The principle of information sharing

We support the principle of information sharing in some circumstances. The law already provides for information sharing concerning children and young people who are at risk. The most relevant statutory express provisions allowing information sharing in the Children Act 1989 are under Sections 17 and 47 and in Schedule 2. The Data Protection Act 1998 does not prevent information sharing, as Schedules 2 and 3 of the act explicitly state that information sharing is permissible in order to protect the vital interests of the person about whom the information is held. The Government also has positive obligations, under the Human Rights Act 1998, to secure Convention rights for all those within its jurisdiction, and so the sharing of some information about individuals is necessary in order to protect these Convention rights.

At paragraph 3.3 of the consultation paper, the Government states that ‘currently it can take a practitioner a great deal of time even to find out which other practitioners are involved with a child or young person with whom they are working.... Recording the contact details of practitioners who are involved with a child or young person is therefore fundamental to the effectiveness of the database'. We agree that for some vulnerable children and young people, this would save valuable time.

It would make more sense, and would be a more proportionate response to actual need, to introduce a smaller database purely for those at risk, and channel the rest of the money into funding and training for social services and other care professionals.

The scope of the proposed information sharing databases

We are concerned that the Government has not established a need for information sharing in the case of the non-vulnerable majority. Universal information sharing raises entirely different issues from sharing information about the vulnerable. In the consultation paper at 3.4, the Government states that ‘contact details for where every child or young person is receiving their universal services would be recorded on the database as part of the basic data' but does not explain why and what positive effect, if any, this might have. This will not ensure better service delivery, as it will take away valuable time from care professionals who are already overworked. The BMA did not authorise participation of its GPs in any of the Trailblazer initiatives for precisely this reason.

The only justification for infringing the privacy rights of the majority would be a substantially more effective regime for child protection. However, the Government's proposals will not deliver this.

The practicalities of the information sharing proposals

The consultation paper proposes to record an indicator of ‘concern' but then later, at several points, rightly identifies that there are problems with this proposed system. If it were satisfactory, the Government would not need to consult on whether there is ‘better terminology'[i] for ‘any alternative [which] can clearly be shown to be less open to misinterpretation'.[ii] The phrase is disliked by a variety of the Act's key stakeholders. The problems it raises include the potential for over-zealous practitioners to record more ‘concerns' than necessary, meaning that the really vulnerable children are included with those who are much less needy, leaving them more at risk. Barnardo's, for example, complain that ‘Cause for concern is not a recognised criterion and will include unclear and subjective information of unproven worth, which may lead to inappropriate interventions while leaving vulnerable children at risk'.[iii]

The Government recognises part of this criticism at 3.28 (vi): ‘the database will "clog up" with flags of concern leading either to inappropriate diversion of resources of to system overload and inertia'. However, the answer given simply restates the Government's position rather than answering the question: ‘an indicator of concern will be raised only in specific circumstances where a practitioner wishes to be contacted about a child by other practitioners'. The word ‘specific' is in fact extremely general, and open to multiple interpretations by a variety of different individuals. It is impossible to legislate for uniformity of concern.

Renaming this problem will not solve it. At the moment the ‘concern' is subject to the individual practitioner's own judgement, and that is the real problem with this system. No single definition exists which can include all the legitimate reasons why a practitioner should be ‘concerned' enough to place a flag against a child's name, while excluding all the illegitimate reasons why this should happen. It is therefore the idea that is impracticable, not the definition.

There is also the point that the practitioners are of widely different types, from teachers and doctors to police, probation officers and prison officers. Suppose a child had behavioural problems which a teacher or doctor thought might eventually lead to trouble with the law. Would they raise this as a concern? Quite possibly. But the same behaviour, seen by a prison officer, might be nothing out of the ordinary, or might be better than average. Would it be the case that any child in custody would because of that fact, have an indicator of concern against his or her name? Would prison officers place an "indicator of no concern" now and then, and leave themselves concerned about the remainder? Is there any common thread running across the multitude of agencies, all with different standards and different experiences?

A far better system would be to have a database set up exclusively for children about whom practitioners are concerned, so their very entry on to this database is an indication that services need to confer about the welfare of the child. This would avoid any interference with the rights to privacy of the remaining majority of children who are not at risk and do not need to be part of the database/index.

The human rights implications of the information sharing provisions

The right of the majority to privacy must not be seen as an unfortunate obstacle which is blocking the right of children to receive good quality co-ordinated care from public services. The right to privacy is enshrined in European and English law, in the European Charter for Human Rights (ECHR) and the 1998 Human Rights Act, respectively. The Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), comprising members from the House of Lords and the House of Commons, has twice scrutinised the Children Bill (now Act) to consider the human rights implications of the information sharing provisions. They have declared concerns about ‘the sweeping nature of the powers conferred on the Secretary of State in relation to the holding and sharing of data on individual children, and the absence of clear safeguards for privacy rights on the face of the Bill'.[iv]

Where the Government wishes to interfere with Article 8 of ECHR it must justify its interference, since the European Court of Human Rights has consistently upheld that the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to a person's enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life.[v] The Explanatory Notes to the Children Act 2004 acknowledge that the creation of databases containing personal details of all children may constitute an interference with Article 8 rights, but asserted that the interference is proportionate and justified under Article 8(2).[vi] However, the JCHR notes that ‘no reasoning was offered to elaborate on this single sentence assertion that the interference with Article 8 is proportionate'.

The key questions which must be asked in order to assess compatibility with Article 8 ECHR were left unanswered, to be dealt with in the regulations. Other human rights organisations, such as Liberty, have criticised the fact that regulations will only be scrutinised in Parliament through affirmative resolution, because this cannot amend legislation, but simply allows that it stand or fall. This has led them to agree with the JCHR that the declaration under section 19(1) (a) on the front of the Children Act 2004 that it is compatible with Convention Rights may well be ‘presumptuous'.[vii]

The data protection implications of the need for consent

The Data Protection Act (1998) is a framework that enables the sharing of existing information rather than being a barrier to it. However, ‘information' about a child cannot be treated as a homogenous block. Rather, detailed consideration needs to be given to the nature and quality of every piece of information that might be shared.

The starting point for such consideration should be the presumption that each and every measure allowing for the sharing of information needs to be justified, rather than the presumption that information sharing is an unqualified good to which exceptions need to be justified. Also, consent should be revocable at any point, and must be informed consent, rather than the ticking of a box.

The Government has not outlined a procedure for dealing with a conflict of consent, when for example the child and its parent/carer disagree.

Further concerns about the information sharing databases

The security of the system

Among the 13 groups who have legitimate access to the data, security is a major issue. Not all of the 13 agencies have technology sophisticated enough to protect against hacking, and in fact this level of protection can never be guaranteed.
Even leaving aside the inevitable problem of illegitimate access to the data, too many groups will have legitimate access to the data. The voluntary sector are far less regulated than others on the list, and even assuming the access is kept strict and tight, there would still be a minimum of several thousand people who would have access to this extremely sensitive data. It is inconceivable that this number of people would not have a single incompetent professional among them, or worse, a single person who would abuse information about vulnerable children.
The potential for abuse of sensitive information is recognised by the Government, but it is unclear that adequate protection for children will be delivered. The Government claims that existing laws and prison sentences will cover abuse of the system and its data. After the event prison sentences or fines come, as a matter of logic, after damage has been done, though they may of course have a deterrent quality. It needs to be recognised that, if safeguards fail, this system will facilitate the abuse of children. The most important preventive measure the Government could introduce is a smaller register limited to vulnerable children, which would be more secure simply by virtue of having fewer people at fewer agencies accessing it on behalf of fewer children.

Errors on the system

The Police National Database is estimated to be between 33% and 70% inaccurate. The Government has not stated what proportion of the data they expect to be inaccurate on this database. Although 100% accuracy is an impossible target, anything less than this will impede rather than facilitate the protection of children.
The Government has not discussed how many data transactions it would expect a year and how it will manage them. If there are 11 million children aged 0-18 on the database, and for every child there are six or seven pieces of basic information, then there is a massive scope for error at many points
There are particular problems in some ethnic groups where the surnames are the same or similar, or indeed where no surname is used, or where the surname comes before the first name. In all of these cases it is easy to envisage details being recorded against the name of the wrong child.

Lack of data for the system

The Government has no figures for the number of children who move house or school per year. DfES officials have suggested 30% mobility in London, but admitted that a trailblazer in Camden showed that there is little information on the true extent of these figures.[viii]
The Government has no satisfactory mechanism for monitoring the changes of address that happen frequently amongst some of the most vulnerable people. The current proposals assume that every single parent/carer will immediately notify their GP of any change of address. This ignores the fact that the most vulnerable are often not registered with a GP in the first place, and that many children of no fixed abode (for example, travellers) choose not to have a stable address.
The Government has no satisfactory mechanism for picking up children who are brought illegally into the country, and who are undoubtedly some of the most at risk. Immigration officials are not allowed to detain children whom they suspect are being trafficked, as long as their paperwork is in order. The proposed information sharing databases would therefore have no benefit for these highly vulnerable children.

Concerns that are specific to education

It is vital for both vulnerable and non-vulnerable children that Special Educational Needs are not seen as a risk factor. This term now encompasses disorders as mild as dyslexia and as severe as terminal medical conditions. If every child with SEN were to have a flag of concern for information marked against them, the vulnerable would be lost among the much larger majority of children with SEN who have supportive parents who may well know more about their welfare than the Government.

Concerns that are shared by a variety of key stakeholders

Most of the services which are required to disclose information for inclusion in the database will have to train or appoint a specific practitioner to have access to the system. The BMA are worried about the amount of time this will take GPs; independent schools, particularly smaller ones, would share this concern.

Concerns that are specific to boarding schools

Some boarding schools are independent and some are maintained by the state. Although enabling legislation has now been passed, the Government is still undecided as to whether the databases will be local or national. If the threshold for the databases is set at local level, boarding schools will have an overwhelming burden of information to co-ordinate, due to their intake of children from different local authorities all over the country as well as outside the country.

Concerns about the practicalities of the database

The Government assumes that all IT solutions will be compatible across the borders of local authorities, in order to create a national database. This will require amounts of money that cannot be estimated at this stage.

It is worth noting that the estimated cost of the proposed database of NHS records was originally £5 million pounds and has since risen to £30 million.

A recent report by the Audit Commission has demonstrated that there is a pervasive culture of minimal compliance in overworked local authorities.[ix] The Government's proposed database requires the absolute professionalism and commitment of every single one of the thousands of potential people accessing it, in order for there to be no errors, inappropriate disclosures, false negatives, false positives, or other misuses of data. This is unrealistic, and the proposals as they stand will enable the creation of thousands of errors and thousands of opportunities for the neglect of children rather than for the safeguarding of their welfare.
The human rights organisation Liberty has significant concerns that this Act ‘makes no attempt to balance or even acknowledge that it has to cater for a balance between information sharing and the right to privacy of individuals'.[x] A functioning universal information sharing database could well be incompatible with the European Charter of Human Rights.

COMMENTS ON NUMBERED PARAGRAPHS

These are further comments on specific numbered paragraphs in the Consultation document

1.2 The databases, by definition, will not identify children who are not on the databases. One of the fundamental problems is the likelihood of children who will be completely missing: birth not registered; in the country illegally (either from the beginning or through over-staying a visa; or brought into the country apparently legally but for the illegal purpose of trafficking). These "missing" people are likely to be among those most at risk.

It is also unclear at what point a temporary resident in the UK (whether legally or not) should be added to the database.

"Quick identification" may be very difficult for children who have frequent changes of address, or who come from a community where surnames are similar or identical.

By identifying "who is involved with or has a concern about a child or young person" the implication is that the fact of any professional contact with a child is recorded and may be available to any one of a number of agencies. That implies that minor contact with the police or probation services is likely to be recorded, even where the interests of the child might best be served by confidentiality. Confidentiality is of prime importance for details of medical psychological and sexual history: the fact of seeking advice for contraception or substance abuse, if on the database, could cause severe damage to the child if not kept confidential.

There will be some children whose medical and sexual history has commercial value - for example the child of a politician or any well-known person seeking contraceptive advice.

1.4 "subject to consent". Consent, to be valid, must be informed. This is not made clear in the Consultation document and should be emphasised. Where sensitive personal data is concerned, the consent must be informed, specific, and must relate to every occasion on which data is transferred. A"blanket" consent is not valid. Relying on a "blanket" consent or on Regulations is likely to result in substantial litigation.

Even basic data (address, sex, etc) may be "sensitive personal data" in some cases. Where a child is of indeterminate sex, that fact is in itself sensitive personal data, and recording it may damage the child psychologically or even physically. Where a child's mother or other carer is in prison, or in a women's refuge, this address will be sensitive personal data. Where a child has been born in prison, this fact, intended to be accessible to database managers throughout the child's first 18 years and possibly longer, will again be sensitive personal data. A young person fleeing abusive parents for whatever reason - physical or sexual abuse, parental objections to a relationship - may, in effect, be in hiding. The young person's address will be sensitive personal data, and may indeed have commercial value if parents are highly motivated to return the young person to their own control. It is not clear that the problems, in a universal database, of recording even basic data have been recognised. A further example would be education in an exclusion centre.

For any child of normal intelligence there will a cross-over point, hard to identify, at which the child's consent must be given by the child rather than by the parent on the child's behalf. Wrongly accepting the parent's consent will be a breach of the child's rights. Uninformed consent is similarly a breach of the child's rights. These are factors which already have to be taken into account where necessary. Making it necessary for all children, rather than for a small minority of children, will greatly increase the difficulties and the potential for litigation.

1.5 We agree with the first sentence. The second sentence is correct as a general comment, but is worryingly imprecise.

1.6 We agree with the concerns noted. It is not clear what is meant by "essential practitioners"

1,7 As stated earlier, it is not clear that "Recording concern" means what it says: the circumstances set out in 3.23 refer specifically to the wish or need to share information, rather than having a concern about the child. Either "concern" is a misleading term; or 3.23 is a misleading exposition, or both

1.7 The words "and only if" should be added before the colon introducing (i)

2.3 "Improved information sharing will make more effective use of resources". A Panglossian statement: yes in the cases where information sharing is in fact improved (trite but true); no if a database is set up and maintained where the majority of entries are of no use at all. It is acknowledged that the databases will not be used for their ostensible purpose for the majority of children. Setting up and keeping up to date records of no value is, axiomatically, a LESS effective use of resources. Of course Green Paper responses were "generally supportive of the need for improved information sharing": that is motherhood and apple pie. The downside of tens of millions of pieces of unused information, entered, verified, referred to, and updated, needs to be taken as a balancing factor

2.4 as noted, the affirmative resolution procedure does not allow amendment. It is contrary to principle for infringements of Human Rights to be approved without debate. "Effective information sharing ... etc" is another Panglossian statement. You still need a rational system to promote it. Setting up databases most of whose information is not going to be used for its ostensible purpose is not rational

2.9 "How the quality of data will be maintained". It is axiomatic that that quality of data will tend to move inversely to the quantity of data. A small, targeted database will tend to be more accurate than a large, all-inclusive database. That basic principle should, on its own, produce a long pause for thought. There are very real risks that the all-inclusive nature of the proposed databases, coupled with the evident fact that most entries at any one time will be valueless (i.e. not used) may produce a culture of carelessness. If most entries are not being used, and may never be used, why bother to keep them up to date and accurate. It is much easier to motivate people if they realise the importance, rather than the redundancy, of what they are doing. We repeat our fear that accuracy targets may be undifferentiated by the difficulty of collecting the data: i.e. accuracy targets may simply be numeric, and may tend to result in data being most accurate for those children least at risk, and least accurate for those children most at risk

2.10 "Sharing of information amongst practitioners working with children, young people and their families is essential to safeguard and promote their welfare". As a general statement this is simply wrong. Sharing of SOME information amongst SOME practitioners working with SOME children etc is essential. For many children, (in fact, on the Government's figures, the majority of children), there is no need for information sharing at all. If information is shared (or otherwise revealed) inappropriately, damage to the child can result. Sharing of information therefore needs to be controlled, proportionate, and in keeping with the Human Rights Act and Data Protection principles. To present information sharing as an unequivocal good is simply wrong.

It is also misleading to use the phrase "in many cases" in the context of an all-inclusive system of databases. It may well be true in many cases, even many hundreds of cases. But against the context of a database containing many millions of children, the "many cases" reduces to a tiny proportion. All the more reason to concentrate resources on the children who do need help, rather than wasting resources setting up a largely redundant all-inclusive system.

2.11 "The information sharing databases will help practitioners". They will certainly help in some cases. Overall, though, the burden of setting up and maintaining databases containing, indeed largely consisting of, redundant material could have the opposite effect of wasting large amounts of valuable professional time. Again, "better communication" will certainly be the case in some instances. But the drag on time of needless data entry needs to be recognised.
2.12 "Detailed sensitive information about a child or young person's needs and circumstances will be kept in individual practitioners' case records, not on the database". As noted earlier, the fact that a child has been involved with, for example, a specialist in drug abuse, alcoholism, behavioural problems, sexual problems etc will tend to identify the nature of the contact and thereby breach the child's right to privacy and confidentiality. Where the rights to privacy and confidentiality need to be overridden for the safety of the child, it may well be the case that sharing of full information is necessary. The current proposal risks revealing information which should be private, while concealing information which should be shared. The rational alterative of a small database limited to children whose right to privacy is overridden by their welfare would remove these risks
2.13 We support the development of children's services directories which enable practitioners, and parents, young people and carers to see what services are available locally and whether children are eligible. The remainder of 2.13 is not specific enough for detailed comment

2.15 We note that details of gender are to be recorded on the databases for all children. This may cause privacy and/or psychological or even physical problems for children of indeterminate gender if this fact is recorded. We note that address; name and contact details of the person with parental responsibility; name and contact details of school; name and contact details of GP practice etc are all details which are liable to change, and that the frequency of change is likely to be directly related to the need for help. That is a further argument for abandoning the concept of databases mostly consisting of redundant information, and concentrating on the minority most in need of help.

2.15 (ii) says that the databases will include "name and contact details for other practitioners involved with a child". That is worryingly imprecise. Will a single consultation with a dietician or a speech therapist be recorded? If yes, a child with a possible, but not definite, eating disorder might not seek necessary treatment because he or she would not want this fact recorded on widely-accessible databases

2.16 "it is estimated that at any one time 3-4 million children and young people have needs for additional targeted and specialist services". Where does this estimate come from, and what does it mean? What is an "additional specialist service"? If it includes, for example, speech therapy, where is the advantage in putting this on the database? Presumably the child will have been referred via a GP, or, if not, the therapist will (as a matter of course) send a report to the GP. Is it true to say that only when a second or subsequent service is accessed that information sharing becomes sensible? If that is the case, the number of children who at any one time need a second or subsequent service is the key figure, and this will be a far lower figure. There is also the point that the "underclass" - a term used by officials - who are difficult to reach may not be on the database at all.

Using rights under the Freedom of Information Act we hereby request the basis for the estimate that "at any one time 3-4 million children and young people have needs for additional targeted and specialist services", including the source of the estimate and the definition of "additional targeted and specialist services". If "have needs for" is not the same as "are accessing", we request the figure for the figures for the numbers accessing these services at any one time. We also request the figures for the total of children and young people accessing a second or subsequent additional specialist or targeted service at any one time.

We also request an estimate of the size of the so-called "underclass", namely the numbers and characteristics of those who will not be on the databases.

2.16 (iii) "all children have a right to the universal services of education and primary health care - the databases will show whether they are receiving those services and will then as necessary trigger local action to ensure they do receive them". To remove a possible ambiguity, we would like assurance that the many cases where children are being educated at home, and will therefore not be "receiving educational services" will not "trigger local action". The concern is that parents who choose to educate children at home may be subject to unnecessary investigation, and that unnecessary flags of concern may be raised in respect of their children. We emphasise that one unnecessary flag of concern in respect of a child may promote further unnecessary flags of concern for the same child, with serious consequences for the welfare of the child

2.17 We are assuming that data will be destroyed at age 18 and not be retained unless, on case by case basis, this is in the best interests of the young person. The wording does not say this in terms: we would oppose any archiving of personally identifiable data or any continuance of live data in other circumstances

2.18 "Data on each child or young person should be kept to the minimum necessary". We agree. The minimum necessary for most children will be zero, and therefore a database for all children is wrong in principle and practice. The proposal to include data for all children, plus indicators of concern "without needing to seek the consent of the child, young person or parent in every case" has the twin merits of being wrong in principle and self-contradictory, unless "in every case" means "in any case". The proposal is that, in any and every case, basic data will be recorded without consent. That is wrong in principle because it is not necessary in a functioning democracy and is therefore incompatible with the Human Rights Act

2.19 This paragraph deals with overriding the common law duty of confidence in accordance with a legal obligation introduced by regulations under Clause 12 of the Children Bill. The common law duty of confidence is a vital element in protecting children (and civil liberties in general). In the specific context of these proposals, children need the assurance that what their access to services concerning, for example, sexual health, contraception, drug abuse and so on will be treated in confidence. To override this central protection is wrong in principle, and to do so by regulation - i.e. without full debate in Parliament - is doubly wrong. None of the proposed options set out in paragraph 3.13 deals adequately with these objections.

2.21 This paragraph deals with consent. It is axiomatic that consent, to be valid, must be informed consent. There is no reference to informed consent. This is a dangerous omission which needs to be repaired. Where sensitive personal data is concerned, "blanket" consent, as noted earlier, is not valid.

2.27 This paragraph deals with security, and is headed with the misleading title "How security will be ensured". A more reasonable title would be "How risks to security will be minimised". Security is an obvious concern for a database containing personal and sensitive details about children, including where they live and go to school, especially where the data is potentially accessible by many thousands of people. It appears, though the wording is not without ambiguity, that "practitioners" will undergo CRB checks. That is essential. It is not stated, and therefore we assume that it is not the intention, that "those managing the database" will undergo CRB checks. It is essential that all those accessing the database, whether practitioners or others in whatever function, are CRB checked.

2.29 We are glad that the risk of "trawling of records" is recognised. We agree that a comprehensive audit trail is needed. We are concerned that no mention is made of the possibility of "trawling" by database managers and database staff: as a matter of logic, these people will tend to have freer access to the system, and are therefore more likely to be capable of abusing the system. There is no mention of audit trails in respect of database managers or staff, or indeed of those people who design or maintain the database systems, and this is a very serious omission. It is fatally serious if these people are not CRB checked. We are very concerned at the possibility of temporary staff or agency staff or freelance consultancy staff having access to the databases, and this possibility needs to be recognised and dealt with. We note (2.31) that "database management [will] be able to see the full history of practitioner involvement": this makes it clear that database management will have wide access to data, and this opens wide possibilities of abuse, which need to be recognised and dealt with

2.30 "How will the quality of the data be maintained?" How indeed: leaving aside the fact that the most vulnerable children may not be on the database at all, it is far from clear that the databases will be able to track frequent changes of address, school, person with parental responsibility, and so on. Frequency of change of data will be strongly associated with less stable backgrounds, and therefore with higher risk. We agree that information "must be up to date and accurate". It won't be. It won't be up to date, because people who move accommodation frequently (or even infrequently) will not be inclined to volunteer details. In some London Boroughs 30% of residents change address each year (this is an estimate from DfES officials). The system will struggle to keep track of even basic data, and will tend to be most accurate where it is least needed - i.e. most accurate for children from a stable background.

A separate point is the accuracy of flags of concern. If a flag of concern is wrongly raised by a specialist in child abuse, for example, the consequences to the child and the family could be horrendous (the nature of the concern will tend to be revealed by the fact of the child being seen by a specialist in child abuse). Inaccuracy is possible in two ways: a wrong concern for the right child, or a right (or wrong) concern for the wrong child: i.e. a concern may be posted to the wrong datafile. Some ethnic groups have similar surnames, or use no surnames at all, or put the surname before the first name. It is entirely possible for children with similar birth dates and similar identifying numbers to have similar names. The fact that inaccurate concerns may be flagged should be recognised, and the potential damage to children and families needs to be taken into account as a balancing factor in assessing the benefits and disbenefits of the proposals. The costs of redress should be added to the costs of the databases, and should be included in the business plan presented to the Secretary of State.

2.31 A practitioner may not know that he or she "is no longer working with a child or young person". In the case of a GP, the child may have moved to another area, and not be registered with any GP at all. Even if the child is seeking to be registered with another GP, delays in the system will tend to mean that at any one time a significant number of records will be out of date

2.32 "Those responsible for the management of databases will be required to ensure that the basic details are kept up-to-date". How? They will not know when children change addresses, for example.

2.33 We agree with this paragraph. It is, though, worrying that the only statement about rectifying errors is "incorrect information must be rectified". There is no indication of how this will be done.

2.34 "Next steps". We suggest that the next steps should be to replace the concept of an all-inclusive database - with all its problems of cost, security, invasion of privacy, overriding of human rights, and risks to children and parents - with the concept of a database targeted at those most in need.

The consultation document states that "On the basis of independent technical advice the Government has concluded that a programme to implement databases is technically and operationally feasible, incorporating robust levels of security using proven existing technology".

Using rights under the Freedom of Information Act we hereby request a copy of the "independent technical advice"; the basis for the conclusion that the programme is "technically and operationally feasible"; details of the "robust levels of security" and a specification of the "proven existing technology".

3.3 This key paragraph is full of confusion. It says, in terms, that "recording the contact details of practitioners who are involved with a child is fundamental to the effectiveness of the database" [as noted earlier, the use of the singular form "database" indicates a single database]

If recording details of practitioners is "fundamental", in order for practitioners "to build up the bigger picture of a child or young person's need" - in itself a dangerously imprecise metaphor - why is the Government proposing, as one of three alternatives that "details of practitioners would never be put on the database" (paragraph 3.10)? Is the Government seriously envisaging a database lacking a fundamental element without which it cannot work effectively?

The issue of consent is dealt with in our response to 3.10: it is worth flagging again that consent must be informed, and that, where sensitive personal information is concerned, consent must be specific to each transfer of data.

Paragraph 3.3 says that the databases "will enable practitioners to find out in one place what other practitioners and services are involved with a particular child or young person". Do they have the right to know? Does a teacher, for example (and teachers are "practitioners") have the right to know that a pupil is seeking counselling or other treatment from someone whose specialty is obesity, anorexia, drug use, venereal disease, rape, HIV and so on, or that the police are "involved with" a child who, for the sake of example, has been raped.? It may well be that parents and the child decide that a teacher should know. Equally, this is sensitive personal information which may well be in the best interests of the child to keep private. If it is a universal database, all human life is here, including HIV, rape and the rest. How a child or young person might best recover from the trauma of being raped - which in itself raises the fear of venereal disease and HIV - is a matter for the individual child and his or her family. It may well be part of "the bigger picture of a child or young person", but there will be many instances where "practitioners" should not have the right to see the "bigger picture", because it may adversely affect the practitioner's view of, and dealings with, the child.

It seems to us that the concept of these databases started with perhaps unquestioning enthusiasm as to the benefits of shared information. The practicalities have started to be recognised, but the logical confusion at the heart of the proposals increases with each recognition of the practical objections to, and difficulties with, the original concept. Tweaking the concept to cope with the difficulties is not going to work in the context of a universal database, because the practical and legal difficulties and dangers increase with volume, and with the intention, which is wrong in principle, to set up a database most of whose subjects will never find it of any benefit at all, but may find it personally damaging. There is a very real chance that the proposals will do more harm than good, at huge cost both directly and in soaking up scarce resources from highly-trained professionals.

"Involved with" is dangerously imprecise: does this include any contact with any practitioner? Suppose a child is assaulted and complains to the police? Is this "contact" with a "practitioner" recorded? If yes, the implications are frightening: the database will record the fact, but not the nature, of the contact. Teachers, doctors and so on will know that the child is "involved with" the police. That will tend to damage the child in their perception, and will give precisely the wrong impression about the child. Please can we have a precise answer to this example.

3.4 What is mean by "additional needs"? We asked officials whether speech therapy would be included, and were told that it would. What is the benefit of recording this on a widely accessible database? The need has been identified, and is being met. The relevant people - child, parent, - will know. The argument that it may become part of the "bigger picture" if the child is later caught shoplifting, for example, is too remote to carry weight. Possible relevance in the future as part of a series of unlikely hypotheses is too remote from the "necessary" recording of information.

3.5 This lists "practitioners". There are 17 classes of practitioner, including teachers, police, doctors, and, in specific terms, practitioners providing support in drug or alcohol misuse, sexual health, HIV and teenage pregnancy. These are all highly sensitive, and "providing support" seems to go far beyond a specialist, and to include a counsellor, perhaps even an untrained volunteer.

If that interpretation is correct, a single instance of teenage pregnancy could "involve" a number of "practitioners". Please can we know whether this interpretation is correct.

3.6 "Why some services may be sensitive". We agree with this paragraph, and with 3.7 and 3.8. The argument stated in the first bullet point of 3.6 is an argument we have made to officials on several occasions since March of last year.

It is, though, important to realise that even basic information may be sensitive. Examples would be address, in the case of a parent and child fleeing from an abusive partner, or a young person fleeing from abusive parents. For a child of indeterminate sex, the recording of this "basic" information could cause immense damage.

The treatment of "sensitive" information is at the heart of the logical conundrums which underpin and undermine these proposals:

Children, young people and families have a right under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to respect for privacy and family life
Under the Data Protection Act, consent to release sensitive personal information, which includes information relating to health, is not valid unless it is informed and specific on each occasion (a "blanket" consent is not valid)
The ECHR rights, and the Data Protection Act barring of the release of sensitive personal information without consent, may, under existing law, be overridden in exceptional circumstances, but the barriers are high: overriding ECHR must be "necessary"; overriding the principle of informed consent requires one of several strict criteria to be met
The starting points, therefore, are protection of privacy; protection of private information; respect for family life; and the principle of informed and specific consent before sensitive personal information is released
In contrast, the Children Act database proposals start from the opposite premiss, which is that information-sharing is an unequivocal good
When this premiss collides, as it is bound to, with ECHR and Data Protection Act principles, the logical, logistical and legal consequences are severe. The reality is that there is a principled, legal, logical, logistically sound and, in general, beneficial case for a database where information is appropriately shared concerning children at risk. Conversely, sharing information concerning the great majority of children who are not at risk is almost certain to be neither legal, logistically sound, nor (in general) beneficial
The dangers of inappropriate information sharing, or indeed malicious access and malicious dissemination, are very real. This danger needs, in all cases, to be reduced to the lowest extent practicable. In the case of children already at risk, the danger is balanced by the benefit to these children of appropriate information sharing. In the case of the majority of children not at risk, and for whom the databases will, on the Government's own figures, be of no benefit whatever during the entirety of their childhood, there is no balancing advantage and only a disbenefit
It is not an effective use of resources to set up databases of children where, according to the Government's own figures, the great majority of entries will never be used for their ostensible purpose
ECHR will need to be taken into account for every entry in the database for every child. That requires a balanced judgment at every stage as to the necessity of entering the information, and the judgment will need to be specific to the individual child. In common with Human Rights and Data Protection lawyers, we foresee a real likelihood of a large number of cases brought against local authorities, the government and "practitioners" - i.e. people who make entries on the database. The cost of these cases, including the cost in judicial time, the cost in time of medical practitioners, and the cost of additional insurance premiums ultimately met by the Government, needs to be taken into account in assessing the cost of these proposals.

3.9 Of the three proposals, Option 1 (automatic recording without consent) is wrong in principle and indefensible, and is therefore not a realistic option. Option 3 (details never put on the database) renders the database ineffective, and is therefore not a realistic option. We therefore do not understand why these two options are stated as realistic options. The effect is to attract universal support for an imprecisely-worded Option 2. This is not an effective consultation process. It would be preferable for Option 2 to be examined in detail with variants, so that the arguments can be properly explored.

Our view is that Data Protection and ECHR principles should apply, and should be specifically referred to. Details of practitioners should be put on the database only with specific informed consent, other than in truly "exceptional circumstances" specifically stated in terms of ECHR and Data Protection principles. "Where the professional judges that it is in the best interests of the child to put their details on the database notwithstanding the lack of consent" is dangerously imprecise, highly subjective, capable of legal challenge, and endangers ECHR and Data Protection Act principles. Option 2 cannot be supported as currently drafted. We are very concerned that the absence of any viable alternative option will lead to apparent approval of Option 2, as the only option approaching viability. We would not consider any such approval to be real.

3.11 Option A is wrong in principle and open to legal challenge, because it is not necessary for "all users able to access the child's record" to see this information. Option B and Option C allow access to be defined by regulations. Regulations cannot deal with the individual case and in particular cannot appreciate, in the individual case, whether release of information is "necessary". Our view is that both options, in the context of a universal database, will inevitably conflict with ECHR principles and will be open to legal challenge. A database limited to children identified as being at risk will not have the same problems, or not to anything like the same degree

3.12 The Government's initial view that Option 2 under 3.10 is the preferred option is hardly surprising, given that Options 1 and 3 are not realistic options. We repeat our concern that Option 2 cannot be supported in its current drafting, and that ostensible approval by respondents will be based on the fact that only Option 2 is even remotely viable.

3.13 Our view is that information-sharing should be under ECHR and Data Protection Act principles and that sharing should therefore be necessary or with specific informed consent, other than in circumstances falling with ECHR and Data Protection Act principles. None of the proposed options meets this criterion. Under 3.13 (i) the word "important" (in "important information") appears from nowhere. Why is it assumed that information on "who else is involved with a child" is important? Most entries on the database will never be used for their ostensible purpose. There will therefore be vast amounts of unused data on the systems.

3.13 (ii) Our view is that access to "specialist services in the areas of sexual health, HIV or abortion" is extremely sensitive and should not be disclosed other than with specific informed consent. Disclosure to the "database manager" (see Option B) and to other "essential practitioners determined by regulations" violates the child's right to privacy. This should be done only when necessary in the context of the individual case. If it is not necessary, the child will have a right of action under ECHR.

ECHR will need to be taken into account for every entry in the database for every child. That requires a balanced judgment at every stage as to the necessity of entering the information, and the judgment will need to be specific to the individual child. Regulations on what might be thought appropriate will not do. In common with Human Rights and Data Protection lawyers, we foresee a real likelihood of a large number of cases brought against local authorities, the government and "practitioners" - i.e. people who make entries on the database. The cost of these cases, including the cost in judicial time, the cost in time of medical practitioners, and the cost of additional insurance premiums ultimately met by the Government, needs to be taken into account in assessing the cost of these proposals.

3.13 (iii) The same considerations apply as in 3.13 (ii).

3.16 -3.28 "Indicators of concern". We repeat our earlier comments; as follows:

Cause for concern. A fundamental of the proposed system is the ability for a practitioner to record an "indicator of concern" about a child, placed against the child's name. The fact, but not the nature, of the concern will be stated. Plainly, an indicator of concern placed by a specialist in sexually transmitted diseases, or pregnancy advice, or sexual abuse, or indeed dyslexia, alcohol abuse or any number of conditions or circumstances will tend to reveal precisely the nature of the concern. Even the fact of the child being seen by such a person, which will in general be recorded, will reveal the nature of the concern. Unless there are stringent safeguards, and it is not clear that there will be, the risks to children are very substantial:

their right to privacy in their access to services will be eroded or removed
knowledge that their teachers or parents, for example, may discover that they have accessed contraceptive services or mental health advice could inhibit them from seeking this advice. There are strong risks that the existence of the databases, far from providing children with the services they need, will discourage them from seeking those services. This is because the common law right to confidentiality is being overridden
knowledge that indicators of concern can be flagged in a widely accessed database may inhibit parents from seeking medical help for their children. A sports-playing child with severe bruising, for example, may not be taken to the doctor in case physical abuse is suspected and flagged. There is significant public scepticism about the common sense and rationality of public services where abuse is suspected, following the well publicised and well-documented Cleveland and Orkney scandals, and the Munchausen's syndrome by proxy controversy
one concern may breed another: one erroneously-posted concern may result in others for the same child, with a series of unfounded concerns added together.
Why call it an indicator of concern? The criteria for raising an indicator of concern are stated in 3.23 of the consultation paper. None of them necessarily indicates concern: i.e. there may be very well be no cause for concern about the individual child. What they do indicate is something which may be totally different, namely that the practitioner has some information which he or she wishes to share. The wish to share information is far from congruent with a cause for concern: there could be no concern but a wish to communicate; or there could be a concern and a wish to keep it private. Either the term of "indicator of concern" is misleading, or the definition in clause 3.23 is misleading, or both. We believe that this term is dangerously imprecise, dangerously misleading, liable to be interpreted in widely different ways by different specialties and practitioners, and should be abandoned.

Rebecca Wildish

Jonathan Shephard

Independent Schools Council

[i] Consultation Response Form question 9

[ii] Consultation para 3.28 (vi)

[iii] Quoted by Tim Loughton MP in Hansard, 02.11.04, Column 219

[iv] Joint Committee on Human Rights, Twelfth Report, Session 2003-04, Scrutiny of Bills: Fifth Progress Report, HL Paper 93/HC 601, Summary

[v] See e.g. M.S. v Sweden (1997) EHRR; R (Robertson) v City of Wakefield MC 92002) 2 WLR 889 (disclosure of details on the electoral roll). These examples are quoted in JCHR, Twelfth Report, Session 2003-04, op. cit., footnote 121

[vi] Explanatory Notes para 209

[vii] Liberty, The Children Bill: Liberty briefing for the second reading in the House of Commons, September 2004, para 5

[viii] Chris Hirst, 08.12.04, meeting at DfES (Caxton House)

[ix] Audit Commission, Human rights: improving the delivery of public services, 2003

[x] Liberty, The Children Bill: Liberty's briefing for the second reading in the House of Commons, September 2004